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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce DeepFake, a novel deep reinforcement learning-based deception strategy
to deal with reactive jamming attacks. In particular, for a smart and reactive jamming attack, the jammer
is able to sense the channel and attack the channel if it detects communications from the legitimate
transmitter. To deal with such attacks, we propose an intelligent deception strategy which allows the
legitimate transmitter to transmit “fake” signals to attract the jammer. Then, if the jammer attacks the
channel, the transmitter can leverage the strong jamming signals to transmit data by using ambient
backscatter communication technology or harvest energy from the strong jamming signals for future
use. By doing so, we can not only undermine the attack ability of the jammer, but also utilize jamming
signals to improve the system performance. To effectively learn from and adapt to the dynamic and
uncertainty of jamming attacks, we develop a novel deep reinforcement learning algorithm using the
deep dueling neural network architecture to obtain the optimal policy with thousand times faster than
those of the conventional reinforcement algorithms. Extensive simulation results reveal that our proposed
DeepFake framework is superior to other anti-jamming strategies in terms of throughput, packet loss,
and learning rate.
Index Terms
Anti-jamming, reactive jammer, deception mechanism, ambient backscatter, RF energy harvesting,
deep dueling, deep Q-learning, deep reinforcement learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the open and broadcast nature of wireless links, wireless communications are extremely
vulnerable to jamming attacks, especially for low-power systems such as Internet of Things
(IoT). In practice, the jammers can easily launch attacks by injecting high-power interference to
the target communication channel [1]. Consequently, the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio
(SINR) at the receiver can be significantly reduced, and thus the receiver may not be able to
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decode the information sent from the transmitter. Among radio jamming methods, dealing with
reactive jamming is very challenging as the jammer can “smartly” attack the channel whenever it
detects transmissions from the transmitter on the channel. In addition, detecting reactive jammer
is more difficult as the detector might not be able to distinguish between the jamming signals
and the signals sent from the transmitter. More importantly, reactive jamming can be easily
launched by conventional jammers by equipping off-the-shelf signal-detection circuits. Thus,
reactive jamming attacks can cause serious consequences in critical communications systems
such as military, medical, and public safety. As such, defending reactive jamming attacks has
been an urgent mission for future wireless communication networks.
A. Current Solutions and Limitations
Various anti-jamming solutions have been proposed in the literature. Nevertheless, these
solutions are not effective in dealing with reactive jammers. In this section, we will study existing
anti-jamming solutions together with their limitations in dealing with reactive jamming attacks.
1) Regulating Transmit Power: Regulating the transmit power at the legitimate transmitter is
the simplest solution and was introduced from the early days of dealing with jamming attacks [2].
In particular, a transmitter can choose to transmit at a very low power level so that the jammer
cannot detect its transmission. However, in this way, the jammer can always force the transmitter
to transmit data at a very low rate, and the transmitter even cannot transmit data if the jammer
is equipped with a very sensitive signal-detection circuit. Another solution for the transmitter
is transmitting signals at a very high power level to dominate jamming signals. Nevertheless,
this solution possesses several drawbacks. First, increasing the transmit power introduces a new
problem as the transmitter can cause unintentional interference to other nearby radio systems [3].
Second, with reactive jammers which can sense the legitimate transmissions and adjust its attack
strategy, e.g., increase the attack power level, transmitting signals at high power levels is not an
effective way. Finally, if the jammer has a sufficient power budget, it can always disrupt all the
ongoing transmissions.
2) Frequency Hopping: Frequency-hopping spread spectrum (FHSS) is a common technology
when dealing with jamming attacks [4]-[7]. The key idea of this technique is using a switching
algorithm that allows the transmitter and receiver to find a new channel for communications once
the current channel is attacked by the jammer. In [4], the authors introduced an integrated bit-level
FHSS transmitter to mitigate jamming attacks for low-power wireless communication systems.
The key idea of the proposed transmitter is exploiting the frequency agility of bulk acoustic wave
resonators. In [7], the authors proposed a hybrid approach to cope with fast-following jammers.
To do that, FHSS and direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) are deployed with 55 frequency
channels in which each channel implements the DSSS modulation with a 16-bit Pseudo noise
code. Differently, the authors in [8] aimed to avoid jamming attacks by introducing a stochastic
game framework. Through the minimax-Q learning algorithm, the transmitter is able to gradually
obtain the optimal defense policy, i.e., how to switch between different channels. Similarly, a
game theory based anti-jamming framework for frequency hopping wireless communications
was introduced in [9] and [10].
Nevertheless, these solutions and others in the literature possess several limitations in dealing
with reactive jamming attacks. First, when the transmitter hops to a new channel, the reactive
jammer also can discern/sense the transmitter’s activities to attack the new channel. Second, the
FHSS schemes require multiple available channels for communications at the same time and
a predefined switching algorithm implemented on both the transmitter and receiver. As such,
this solution may not be feasible to widely implement on resource-constrained and channel-
limited wireless systems. More importantly, if the jammers have sufficient energy to attack all
the channels simultaneously, the FHSS schemes do not work anymore. In addition, the game
models proposed in [8], [9], and [10] may not be effective as they require complete information of
the jammer, which may not be available in advance in practice especially when dealing with the
reactive jammer which can adjust its attack strategy by sensing the transmitter’s transmissions.
3) Rate Adaptation: Another countermeasure to prevent and mitigate impacts of jamming
attacks is the rate adaptation (RA) technique [11]-[14]. The key principle of the RA technique is
that the transmitter can reduce its data rate under jamming attacks. In particular, under jamming
attacks, the channel condition is not good with interference from the jammer. Thus, reducing
the data rate is a potential solution as a lower rate is more reliable and suitable for poor channel
quality [14]. However, this technique possesses several limitations. The authors in [14] and [12]
demonstrated that the RA technique is not effective on a single channel and in dealing with
reactive jamming attacks. In particular, this technique assumes that the transmitter can observe
the actual jammer’s attack performance before selecting an appropriate transmission rate at which
the receiver can successfully decode the information. However, for reactive jammers, they only
attack the channels after the transmitter transmits data, and thus the RA technique is not effective
in dealing with the reactive jammers.
4) Recent Solutions: Recently, there are some new ideas introduced to deal with jamming
attacks which are especially efficient for low-power systems. Specifically, the authors in [16]
proposed the idea of harvesting energy from jamming signals. This is stemmed from the fact that
the jammers usually use high transmission power levels to disturb legitimate communications,
and thus the limited-energy devices (e.g., IoT devices) can harvest an abundant energy from
the jammers by using RF energy harvesting techniques. In [17], the authors introduced a new
approach of using ambient backscatter technology [20] to deal with jamming attacks. The key
idea of this approach is that when the jammer attacks the channel, the transmitter can backscatter
the jamming signals to transmit data to the receiver. With these solutions, the transmitter does
not need to “hide” or “escape” from the jammer as it can leverage the strong jamming signals
for its transmissions. As such, the more power the jammer uses to attack the channel, the more
benefit, e.g., harvested energy and throughput, the transmitter can achieve. However, for these
solutions, they only work well with proactive jammers because the transmitter only can harvest
energy or backscatter from jamming signals after the jammers attack the channel. For reactive
jammers, they will not attack if there is no activities of the transmitter on the channel, and
thus these solutions are not applicable to defeat the reactive jammers. Given the above, dealing
with reactive jammers is very challenging, especially for low-power communication systems and
when the jammer’s power budget is high. To the best of our knowledge, all current anti-jamming
approaches cannot efficiently deal with reactive jamming attacks.
B. Main Contributions
In this paper, we develop an intelligent anti-jamming framework to cope with a powerful
reactive jammer which can attack the channel once it detects active transmissions from the
transmitter. In particular, we first introduce a deception mechanism that allows the transmitter
to lure the jammer by actively transmitting signals for a short period of time. After that, if the
jammer attacks the channel, we propose the ideas that allow the transmitter to either harvest
energy from the jamming signal, backscatter jamming signals to transmit data using ambient
backscatter technology, or actively transmit data based on RA technique. Moreover, to deal
with the dynamic and uncertainty of jamming attacks, we develop a new Markov decision
process framework with two decision epochs over one time slot to formulate the anti-jamming
deception strategy for the transmitter and then use the Q-learning algorithm to maximize the
long-term average throughput for the legitimate communication system. Although the Q-learning
algorithm is an effective tool to help the transmitter obtain the optimal policy without requiring
jammer’s information in advance, its convergence is usually very slow and might not be efficient
to implement in practice. Thus, we develop a novel deep dueling reinforcement learning algorithm
that enables the transmitter to obtain the optimal policy thousand times faster than those of the
conventional reinforcement learning methods, e.g., Q-learning and deep Q-learning algorithms.
The key idea of this algorithm is dividing the deep neural network into two sequences, i.e.,
streams, of fully connected layers to separately estimate the values of states and advantages of
actions, and thus the convergence rate can be significantly improved. It is worth noting that the
reactive jammer can adjust its attack policy by sensing the activities of the transmitter on the
channel, e.g., actively transmit or idle. Thus, with a very fast convergence rate, our proposed
solution can quickly and efficiently adapt the optimal defense strategy when the jammer adjusts
its policy. Extensive simulation results then show that our proposed solution can achieve a very
good performance in terms of throughput and packet loss compared with other conventional
anti-jamming strategies. Interestingly, we show that with our proposed solution, the transmitter
can utilize the power from jamming signals, and thus the more power the jammer uses to attack
the channel, the greater performance we can achieve.
The key contributions of the paper are summarized as follows:
• Propose the intelligent anti-jamming deception strategy that can not only undermine the
jammer’s attack ability, but also leverage the jammer’s power to enhance the system per-
formance.
• Introduce the novel ideas of using RF energy harvesting and ambient backscatter techniques
which can further exploit jamming signals to achieve greater performance.
• Develop a new MDP model to deal with reactive jamming attacks and propose the reinforce-
ment algorithm to help the transmitter obtain the optimal defense policy without requiring
information about jammer in advance.
• Propose the deep dueling algorithm with a novel neural network architecture to quickly
obtain the optimal defense policy for the system.
• Perform extensive simulations to show the efficiency of our proposed solutions as well as
to study key factors which have significant impacts in defeating reactive jamming attacks.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section II and Section III describe the system
model and the problem formulation, respectively. Section IV presents the Q-learning and deep
Q-learning algorithms. Then, the deep dueling algorithm is introduced in Section V. After that,
the simulation results are discussed in Section VI. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a wireless system in which a transmitter communicates with a receiver through
a dedicated channel C as shown in Fig. 1. In particular, the transmitter is equipped with a data
queue to store data before transmitting to the receiver. The maximum data queue size is denoted
by D. When a new packet arrives at the transmitter, if the data queue is not full, the packet
will be stored in the queue. Otherwise, the packet will be dropped. We assume that time is
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Fig. 1: An illustration of deception strategy to deal with reactive jamming attacks.
slotted, and at each time slot there are K packets arriving at the data queue with probability λ.
Additionally, the transmitter is equipped with an energy harvesting circuit and an energy storage.
By using the energy harvesting technology, the transmitter can harvest energy from the jamming
signals when the jammer attacks the channel. The harvested energy will then be stored in the
energy storage to support operations of the transmitter. The maximum energy storage capacity is
denoted by E. In addition to harvest energy from jamming signals, the transmitter is also able to
harvest energy from surrounding RF signals, and we assume that the transmitter can harvest ev
units of energy with probability pe at each time slot. For example, a fundamental energy unit can
be considered to be 60 µJ [32]. The transmitter is also equipped with an ambient backscatter
circuit [18] to be able to backscatter data to its receiver if the jammer attacks the channel.
A. Reactive Jammer
In this work, we consider a powerful reactive jammer1 which can attack the channel when it
detects active transmissions from the transmitter. Intuitively, based on a common signal detection
1Note that our system model can be extended straightforwardly to the case with multiple jammers which can cooperatively
attack the channel, i.e., only one jammer attacks the channel at a time.
mechanism, e.g., energy detection [23], [24], the jammer can detect the activity of the transmitter
and attack the channel by transmitting strong signals to the channel to reduce the effective signal-
to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at the receiver. In particular, under the jammer attack,
the SINR at the receiver can be formally expressed by [1], [12]:
θ =
PR
φP J + ρ2
, (1)
where PR is the received power from the transmitter at the receiver, φP J expresses the jamming
power received at the receiver in which 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1 is an attenuation factor, and ρ2 is the variance
of additive white Gaussian noise. We denote Pavg as the time-average power constraint of the
jammer and Pmax as the peak jamming power, i.e., Pavg ≤ Pmax [12].
In this work, once detecting activities of the transmitter on the target channel, the reactive
jammer can attack the channel with different power levels at different probabilities. This strategy
is much more intelligent and beneficial for the jammer than the fixed strategy, i.e., always
attack at the same power level, as the jammer can adjust its attack power levels based on
the activities of the transmitter, e.g., actively transmit, use the RA technique or stay idle. Let
PJ = {P J0 , . . . , P Jn , . . . , P JN} denote the vector of N discrete jamming power levels. We denote
x , (x0, . . . , xn, . . . , xN) as an attack probability vector. In each time slot, if the transmitter
actively transmits data on the target channel, the jammer can select any transmit power level
P Jn as long as its average power constraint is satisfied. Then, the attack strategy space of the
jammer Js can be defined as follows:
Js ,
{
(x0, . . . , xn, . . . , xN),
N∑
n=0
xn = 1, xn ∈ [0, 1],∀n ∈ {0, . . . , N},xP>J ≤ Pavg
}
. (2)
B. Deception Strategy
In this paper, we propose an intelligent deception mechanism that allows the system to not
only undermine the jammer’s attack efficiency but also leverage the jamming signals to improve
the system performance. In particular, at the beginning of each time slot, the transmitter can
lure the jammer by actively transmitting signals for a short period of time2. In this case, if
the jammer attacks the channel, the transmitter can leverage the jamming signals to support its
operations. This strategy is very beneficial for low-power systems even in dealing with a very
powerful reactive jammer. The reason is that if the jammer often attacks the channel at high
2It is noted that the deception time must be higher than the detection time of the jammer. The transmitter can observe
the activities of jammer during the learning process, and then determine the optimal deception time. Determining the optimal
deception time is out of scope of this paper.
power levels, the jammer will unintentionally provide an abundant energy resource to supply for
the legitimate system.
In the system under considerations, we assume that time is slotted, and at the beginning of
a time slot, the transmitter can choose to actively transmit data or perform deception strategy.
If the transmitter chooses to actively transmit data and the jammer does not attack the channel
(as illustrated in Fig. 1(a)), the transmitter can successfully transmit maximum d̂a packets. If the
jammer attacks the channel, the transmitter cannot actively transmit packets to the receiver as
shown in Fig. 1(b). Each packet requires er units of energy to be successfully transmitted. On the
other hand, if the transmitter performs the deception, it will first transmit signals on the channel
for a short period. After that, the transmitter listens the channel to detect activities of the jammer.
We denote ef as the total amount of energy that the transmitter needs to perform deception
(including the sensing process). If the jammer does not attack the channel after deception, the
transmitter can choose to actively transmit maximum d̂de packets to the receiver in the rest of
the time slot (d̂de < d̂a) as illustrated in Fig. 1(c). In contrast, if the jammer attacks the channel,
the transmitter can choose one of three actions: (i) reduce transmission rate by using the RA
technique, (ii) harvest energy from the jamming signals, or (iii) backscatter data through the
jamming signals as illustrated in Fig. 1(d), Fig. 1(e), and Fig. 1(f) respectively.
1) Rate Adaptation: Based on jamming power P Jn , the transmitter can actively transmit data at
maximum rate rm by using the rate adaptation technique. We then denote r = {r1, . . . , rm, . . . , rM}
as the set of M transmission rates that the transmitter can support to transmit data under jamming
attacks. At each rate rm, the transmitter can transmit maximum d̂rm packets. We define γm as
the lowest SINR value at which the receiver can successfully decode packets sent at rate rm.
The higher transmission rate requires the higher value of SINR at the receiver [1]. Thus, for
m = 1, . . . ,M , when γm−1 ≤ θ < γm, the receiver only can decode packets sent at rates
r0, r1, . . . , rm−1, and the packets sent at rate rm or higher will be completely lost [1]. To detect
the states of the jammer, i.e., idle or attack, after deception, several detection techniques can be
adopted, e.g., energy detection [23], [24]. If the transmitter fails to detect the attack power level
of the jammer, the transmitted packets will be lost. We then denote pmiss as the miss detection
probability of the transmitter in detecting attack power levels of the jammer.
2) RF Energy Harvesting: If the jammer attacks the channel with power level P Jn (after the
transmitter performs the deception), the transmitter can harvest eJn units of energy from the
jamming signals through the energy harvesting circuit and then store the harvested energy in the
energy storage to support for future deception and actual transmission activities [18]. We then
denote e = {eJ0, . . . , eJn, . . . , eJN} as the amount of energy that the transmitter can successfully
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harvest from the jamming signals according to the attack power levels of the jammer. Intuitively,
the more power the jammer uses to attack the channel, the more energy the transmitter can
successfully harvest from the jamming signals. This proportional relationship can be observed
clearly through the Friis equation [19] in which the amount of harvested energy can be expressed
by a linear function of transmission power of the jammer.
3) Ambient Backscatter Communications: The transmitter can also backscatter the jamming
signals to transmit data to the receiver by using the ambient backscatter circuit as shown in
Fig. 2(a) [20]. In particular, by switching between two loads Z1 and Z2 with an RF switch, e.g.,
ADG902, the transmitter can switch between two states: (i) reflecting and (ii) non-reflecting.
At the non-reflecting state, all the RF signals (i.e., the jamming signals in this paper) will
be absorbed, and thus this state represents bits ‘0’. Otherwise, at the reflecting state, all the
RF signals will be reflected to the receiver, and thus this state represents bits ‘1’. As such,
with ambient backscatter technology, the transmitter can backscatter data to the receiver without
requiring any active component. It is worth noting that at the non-reflecting state, the transmitter
can harvest energy from the RF signals, but the amount of the harvested energy is relatively small
and only suitable for operations of the backscatter mode. Through many real experiments and
analysis on backscatter communication systems in the literature, e.g., [20], [21], [22], it can be
observed that the more power the RF source uses to transmit signals (i.e., the jammer attacks the
channel at high power levels), the more energy per information bit the transmitter can backscatter
to the receiver, and thus the less Bit Error Rate (BER) of backscatter communication is. This
also implies that the more packets the transmitter can successfully transmit to the receiver by
backscattering the jamming signals when the jammer uses higher power levels to attack. It is
worth noting that several ambient backscatter prototypes have been introduced in the literature
with backscatter rates up to few Mbps [18]. Thus, using ambient backscatter to leverage the
strong jamming signals is a very promising solution.
If the jammer attacks the channel with power level P Jn after deception, the transmitter can trans-
mit maximum d̂Jn packets to the receiver through using the backscatter technique. We denote d̂ =
{d̂J0, . . . , d̂Jn, . . . , d̂JN} as the number of packets that the transmitter can successfully backscatter to
the receiver when the jammer attacks the channel with power level PJ = {P J0 , . . . , P Jn , . . . , P JN},
respectively. Note that the backscatter rate depends on the hardware configuration, i.e., the values
of the RC circuit elements in Fig. 2(b) [20]. Thus, in this work, we consider that the backscatter
rate is fixed at a maximum rate of dmax packets. If the maximum number of packets that can be
backscattered at jamming power P Jn is lower than dmax, (dmax − d̂Jn) packets will be lost as the
jamming signals is not strong enough to support the transmitter to transmit all dmax packets.
To decode the backscattered signals, there are two approaches: (i) using an analog-to-digital
converter (ADC) and (ii) using the averaging mechanism [20], [18]. However, as the ADC
consumes a significant amount of energy, the averaging mechanism is usually adopted in the
literature (especially in IoT networks) to allow the receiver to decode the backscattered signals
by using analog components as illustrated in Fig. 2(b). The key idea of the averaging mechanism
is using the envelope-averaging circuit to smooth the backscattered signals received at the
receiver. Then, the voltage between low and high levels of the smoothed signals is calculated by
the compute-threshold circuit. Finally, the comparator compares this voltage with a predefined
threshold to derive output bits, i.e., zero and one, properly. More information about decoding
algorithms and hardware designs can be found in [20].
C. Jammer Performance Analysis
To theoretically elaborate the efficiency of proposed deception mechanism, in the following,
we evaluate the jammer utility under the transmitter’s deception strategy. At the beginning of
each time slot, if the transmitter actively transmits actual data, and if the jammer attacks the
channel, all packets transmitted by the transmitter are lost. In this case, the jammer can receive
a reward of 0 ≤ da ≤ d̂a (corresponding to the number of dropped packets). Thus, the jammer’s
utility function for this case can be expressed as follows:
UJ1 =
{
da if the transmitter transmits actual data and the jammer attacks the channel.
−da if the transmitter transmits actual data and the jammer does not attack the channel.
(3)
If the transmitter chooses to use ef units of energy to perform the deception, the jammer
will get a reward of ef
er
. Here, ef
er
can be interpreted as the potential number of packets that
the transmitter can transmit without performing deception. If the jammer decides to attack the
channels, the transmitter can leverage the jamming signals to harvest eJn units of energy or
backscatter 0 ≤ dJn ≤ d̂Jn packets or using the rate adaptation to transmit 0 ≤ drm ≤ d̂rm packets.
Note that the harvested energy can be used to actively transmit data or perform deception actions
later. Thus, the penalty for the jammer if the transmitter harvests energy from the jamming
signals can be expressed by − eJn
er
, i.e., the number of potential packets which the transmitter can
transmit from the harvested energy. Similarly, we can denote −dJn and −drm to be the penalties
for the jammer if the transmitter uses backscatter and rate adaptation techniques to transmit data,
respectively. Hence, the utility function of the jammer in this case can be expressed as follows:
UJ2 =

ef
er
− eJn
er
if the transmitter harvests energy from the jamming signals,
ef
er
− dJn if the transmitter backscatters data through the jamming signals,
ef
er
− drm if the transmitter adapts its transmission rate,
ef
er
if the transmitter stays idle.
(4)
Finally, if the transmitter performs deception, but the jammer does not attack the channel,
then the transmitter can actively transmit data in the rest of the time slot. In this case, the
transmitter will waste ef units of energy for the deception action, but it can successfully transmit
0 ≤ dde ≤ d̂de packets to the receiver. Thus, we can derive the utility function of the jammer in
this case as follows:
UJ3 =
{
ef
er
− dde if the transmitter transmits data,
ef
er
if the transmitter stays idle.
(5)
Then, we derive the jammer’s expected overall utility as follows:
U = UJ1 + U
J
2 + U
J
3 . (6)
In (6), it can be observed that if the jammer attacks the channel at high frequency and at
the same time the transmitter often performs deception strategy, then the efficiency of jamming
attack will be significantly reduced. However, if the jammer does not often attack the channel
and the deception probability is high, then the deception strategy is not effective. As a result, in
order to maximize the performance for the system, the transmitter needs to know the jammer’s
strategy, e.g., power levels and frequency of attacks, in advance. Unfortunately, this information
is usually unknown by the transmitter in advance. Thus, in this paper, we propose reinforcement
learning approaches to enable the transmitter to deal with the uncertainty and dynamic of the
jammer and the environment by learning from real-time interactions.
Note that the amount of harvested energy and the number of backscattered/transmitted packets,
i.e., da, dde, dJn, e
J
n, and d
r
m, can be observed after interacting with the jammer. Thus, our proposed
solutions do not require this explicit information in advance. Instead, the learning algorithms
learn these values and find the optimal policy for the transmitter. For example, in the case if
the jammer often attacks the channel at low power levels, the number of backscattered packets
and the amount of harvested energy could be low. As such, our proposed reinforcement learning
algorithms can learn and find the optimal policy to guide the transmitter to choose the best
actions, e.g., rate adaptation instead of backscattering, to maximize the system performance.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
To learn from and adapt with the jammer’s behaviors as well as the uncertainty of the environ-
ment, we adopt the Markov decision process (MDP) framework to formulate the optimization
problem. The MDP is defined by a tuple < S,A, r > where S is the state space, A is the
action space, and r is the immediate reward function of the system. For a conventional MDP
process, at the beginning of a time slot, the transmitter observes the current system state, e.g.,
data, energy and channel states, performs an action, e.g., active data transmission or deception,
and observes the results in the end of the time slot, e.g., packets are successfully transmitted
or dropped. However, this conventional process is not appropriate to adopt in our model to
defeat the reactive jammer. The reason is that the reactive jammer only attacks channel if it
detects activities of the transmitter on the channel, and thus at the beginning of a time slot, the
channel state is always idle. Second, for the conventional MDP process with only one decision
epoch, after the transmitter performs deception and the jammer attacks the channel, we only can
undermine the jammer’s power, but cannot leverage jamming signals for enhancing the system
performance. We thus propose a new MDP model with two decision epochs, i.e., one at the
beginning of a time slot and another is after the deception period as illustrated in Fig. 3. To be
more specific, at the first decision epoch, i.e., at the beginning of a time slot, the transmitter
observes the current system state, including data queue, energy queue, deception and channel
states, and makes an action, e.g., deception or actively transmit actual data. Then, at the beginning
of the second decision epoch, i.e., right after the deception period, the transmitter observes the
new states, e.g., whether the jammer attacks the channel or not, and then makes an action, e.g.,
backscatter or harvest energy from jamming signals if the jammer attacks the channel. In this
way, we can not only undermine the jammer’s power, but also utilize its power for improving
the system performance.
A. State Space
The state space of the system can be defined as follows:
S ,
{
(f, j, d, e) | f ∈ {0, 1}; j ∈ {0, 1}; d ∈ {0, . . . , D}; e ∈ {0, . . . , E}
}
\ {0, 1, d, e}, (7)
Observe state s=(j,d,e) and make an action
One time slot
Observe state s=(f,j,d,e) and 
perform the deception
Observe new state s’=(f,j,d,e) and 
make an action
(a)
(b)
Deception
Fig. 3: Decision epoch of (a) conventional MDP and (b) proposed MDP.
where d and e represent the number of packets in the data queue and the number of energy units
in the energy storage of the transmitter, respectively. D and E are the maximum data queue
size and energy storage capacity, respectively. f represents the deception strategy of transmitter,
i.e., f = 1 when the deception is performed and f = 0 otherwise. Note that f is always 0 at
the first epoch, but could be 0 or 1 in the second epoch of a time slot. j represents the state of
the jammer, i.e., j = 1 when the jammer attacks the channel and j = 0 otherwise. Note that at
the first epoch of a time slot, j is always 0. However, after the deception is made, j could be
0 or 1. Moreover, at the second epoch, the jammer only attacks the channel if the transmitter
performs the deception at the first epoch. Thus, the system state space does not include state
s = {0, 1, d, e}. The system state is then defined as a composite variable s = (f, j, d, e) ∈ S.
B. Action Space
We denote A , {a : a ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 4 +m}} as the action space of the transmitter in which
a = 1 represents the action of performing the deception. At the beginning of a time slot, if the
transmitter has enough energy (i.e., e ≥ ef), it can choose to perform the deception. In this case,
we have the following actions:
a =

2, the transmitter transmits data if f = 1, j = 0, d > 0, and e > er,
3, the transmitter harvests energy if f = 1,j = 1, and e < E,
4, the transmitter backscatters data if f = 1,j = 1, and d > 0,
4 +m, the transmitter adapts its transmission to rate rm if f = 1, j = 1, d > 0, and e > er,
0, the transmitter stays idle.
(8)
In particular, after performing the deception, the transmitter listens to the channel. If the
jammer does not attack the channel, i.e., j = 0, the data queue is not empty, and there is enough
energy in the energy storage, the transmitter can choose to actively transmit data to the receiver
in the rest of the time slot. If the jammer attacks the channels, i.e., j = 1, the transmitter can
choose to harvest energy from the jamming signals in the rest of the time slot. If the data queue
is not empty, the transmitter can choose to backscatter data to the receiver in the rest of the time
slot. Additionally, the transmitter can choose to reduce its data rate to actively transmit data to
the receiver if it has data in the data queue and has enough energy for active transmissions in
the energy storage. Otherwise, the transmitter can choose to stay idle for the rest of the time
slot.
If the transmitter decides not to perform the deception at the beginning of the time slot, we
have the following actions:
a =
{
2, the transmitter actively transmits data if d > 0 and e > er,
0, the transmitter stays idle.
(9)
Specifically, in this case, the transmitter can choose to actively transmit data if it has data in the
data queue and has enough energy in the energy storage for active transmissions. Alternatively,
the transmitter can decide to stay idle in this time slot. The flowchart of the transmitter’s actions
is illustrated in Fig. 4.
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 Rate adaptation 
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 Stay idle (a=0)
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Fig. 4: Flowchart to express actions of transmitter.
C. Immediate Reward
We define the reward function for the system as the number of packets that are successfully
transmitted to the receiver. Thus, the immediate reward of the system over one time slot after
the transmitter takes an action a at state s can be defined as follows:
r(s, a) =

da, if a = 2 and f = 0,
dde if a = 2 and f = 1,
dJn, if a = 4,
drm, if a = 4 +m,
0, otherwise.
(10)
In (10), if the transmitter chooses to actively transmit data at the beginning of a time slot
and the jammer does not attack the channel, it can successfully transmit da ≤ d̂a packets to the
receiver. If the transmitter performs deception and the jammer does not attack the channel, the
transmitter can transmit dde ≤ d̂de packets to the receiver. However, if the transmitter performs
deception and the jammer attacks the channel, the transmitter can backscatter dJn ≤ d̂Jn packets
or transmit drm ≤ d̂rm packets (using rate adaption technique) to the receiver. Note that the
rewards of harvesting energy from jamming signals and deception activities can be captured by
the number of packets which are successfully transmitted to the receiver. Finally, the immediate
reward is 0 if the transmitter cannot successfully transmit any packet to the receiver.
Note that after performing an action, the transmitter observes its reward, i.e., the number of
packets that are successfully transmitted based on ACK messages sent from the receiver. In
other words, da, dde, dJn, and d
r
m are the actual number of packets received at the receiver. As
such, the reward function captures the overall path between the receiver and the transmitter, e.g.,
end-to-end SNR, BER, or fading.
D. Optimization Formulation
In this work, we aim to obtain the optimal defense policy to maximize the average long-term
throughput of the system, denoted by pi∗ : S → A. In particular, the optimal policy is a mapping
from a given state, i.e., data queue, energy level, jammer state, and deception status, to an optimal
action. The optimization problem is then expressed as follows:
max
pi
R(pi) = lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
E (rk(sk, pi(sk))) , (11)
where rk(sk, pi(sk)) is the immediate reward under policy pi at time step k and R(pi) is the
average reward of the transmitter under the policy pi. In Theorem 1, we show that the average
throughput R(pi) is well defined and does not depend on the initial state.
THEOREM 1. For every pi, the average throughput R(pi) is well defined and does not depend
on the initial state.
The proof of Theorem 1 is provided in Appendix A.
IV. OPTIMAL DEFENSE STRATEGY WITH REINFORCEMENT LEARNING ALGORITHMS
A. Q-Learning based Deception Strategy
In this section, we propose the Q-learning algorithm to deal with the dynamic and uncertainty
of the jammer. In particular, this algorithm does not require the information about the jammer
in advance. Instead, it learns from the previous experiences to find the optimal defense policy
for the transmitter. According to [26], it was proved that the Q-learning algorithm will converge
to the optimal policy with probability one after a finite number of iterations. In the following,
we present the key idea behind the Q-learning algorithm.
We denote pi∗ : S → A as the optimal defense policy, which is a mapping from system states
to their corresponding actions, for the transmitter under the jamming attacks. For each policy pi,
the expected value function Vpi(s) : S → R can be expressed as follows:
Vpi(s) = Epi
[ ∞∑
t=0
γrt(st, at)|s0 = s
]
= Epi
[
rt(st, at) + γVpi(st+1)|s0 = s
]
, (12)
where rt(st, at) is the immediate reward achieved after performing action at at state st and
0 ≤ γ < 1 is the discount factor which represents the importance of long-term reward [26]. To
find the optimal policy pi∗, the optimal action at each state can be found by using the following
optimal value function.
V∗(s) = max
a
{
Epi[rt(st, at) + γVpi(st+1)]
}
, ∀s ∈ S. (13)
Thus, the optimal Q-functions for all pairs of states and actions are derived as follows:
Q∗(s, a) , rt(st, at) + γEpi[Vpi(st+1)], ∀s ∈ S. (14)
Then, the optimal value function V∗(s) can be written as V∗(s) = maxa{Q∗(s, a)}. By making
samples iteratively, the problem is reduced to determining the optimal value of Q-function, i.e.,
Q∗(s, a), for all state-action pairs. In particular, the Q-function is updated according to (15).
Qt+1(st, at) = Qt(st, at) + τt
[
rt(st, at) + γmax
at+1
Qt(st+1, at+1)−Qt(st, at)
]
. (15)
Specifically, (15) is used to find the temporal difference between the predicted Q-value, i.e.,
rt(st, at) + γmaxat+1 Qt(st+1, at+1) and its current value, i.e., Qt(st, at). The learning rate τt
determines the impact of new information to the existing value. During the learning process, the
learning rate can be adjusted dynamically, or it can be chosen to be a constant. To guarantee
the convergence for the Q-learning algorithm, the learning rate τt is deterministic, nonnegative,
and satisfies the following conditions [26]:
τt ∈ [0, 1),
∞∑
t=1
τt =∞, and
∞∑
t=1
(τt)
2 <∞. (16)
Based on (15), the algorithm updates the Q-values for all state-action pairs. In particular,
based on the -greedy algorithm, at the current state st, the algorithm selects a random action
with probability  and selects an action that maximizes the Q-value function with probability
1 − . After performing the chosen action, the algorithm observes the next system state and
immediate reward to update the Q-table based on (15). After a finite number of iterations, the
algorithm will obtain the optimal defense policy for the system [26]. Nevertheless, the Q-learning
based algorithms are well-known for their slow-convergence, especially in complicated systems
with high-dimensional state and actions spaces. To deal with this problem, in the following, we
propose the deep dueling algorithm to allow the transmitter to obtain the optimal policy with a
much faster convergence rate by leveraging the deep Q-learning and novel dueling architecture.
B. Deep Q-Learning based Deception Strategy
In this section, we propose the deep Q-learning algorithm [27] to cope with the slow-convergence
problem of the Q-learning algorithm introduced in Section IV. The deep Q-learning algorithm
implements a deep neural network instead of the Q-table to find the approximated values of
Q∗(s, a).
According to [27], the performance of reinforcement learning approaches might not be stable
or even diverges when using a nonlinear function approximator. The reason is that with a small
change of Q-values, the data distribution and correlations between the Q-values and the target
values, i.e., r + γmaxaQ(s, a), are varied, and thus the policy is greatly affected. To address
this issue, we use three mechanisms, i.e., experience replay, target Q-network, and feature set.
• Experience replay mechanism: The algorithm implements a replay memory D, i.e., memory
pool, to store transitions (st, at, rt, st+1) instead of running on state-action pairs as they
occur during experience. Random samples from the memory pool are then fed to the deep
neural network for training. In this way, the algorithm can efficiently learn from previous
experiences many times and remove the correlations between observations [27].
• Quasi-static target Q-network: Obviously, the Q-values will be changed during the training
process. As a result, the value estimations can be out of control if a constantly shifting set
of values is used to update the Q-network resulting in the destabilization of the algorithm.
To overcome this issue, the deep Q-learning algorithm implements a target Q-network to
frequently but slowly update to the primary Q-network. As such, the correlations between the
target and estimated Q-values are significantly eliminated, thereby stabilizing the algorithm.
• Feature set: For each state, we determine four features including the activities of the
jammer and the status of the deception as well as the status of data and energy queues
of the transmitter. These features are then fed to the deep neural network to approximate
Q-values for each state-action pair. Doing so, all aspects of each state are trained resulting
in a high convergence rate.
Algorithm 1 Deep Q-learning Based Anti-jamming Algorithm
1: Initialize replay memory D to capacity D.
2: Initialize the Q-network Q with random weights θ.
3: Initialize the target Q-network Qˆ with weight θ− = θ.
4: for episode=1 to I do
5: With probability  select a random action at, otherwise select at = argmaxQ∗(st, at; θ).
6: Perform action at and observe reward rt and next state st+1.
7: Store transition (st, at, rt, st+1) in the replay memory D.
8: Sample random mini-batch of transitions (sj, aj, rj, sj+1) from D.
9: yj = rj + γmaxaj+1 Qˆ(sj+1, aj+1; θ−).
10: Perform a gradient descent step on (yj − Q(sj, aj; θ))2 with respect to the network
parameter θ.
11: Every C steps reset Qˆ = Q.
12: end for
Algorithm 1 provides the details of the deep Q-learning algorithm. In particular, the training
phase consists of multiple episodes. At each episode, given the current state, the algorithm
chooses an action based on the epsilon greedy algorithm. The algorithm will start with a fairly
randomized policy and later slowly move to a deterministic policy. In other words, at the first
episode,  is set at a large value, e.g., 0.9, and gradually decayed to a small value, e.g., 0.1. After
that, the algorithm performs the selected action and observes results from taking this action, i.e.,
next state and reward. This transition is then stored in the replay memory for training process at
later episodes. In the learning process, random samples of transitions from the replay memory
will be fed into the neural network. The algorithm then updates the neural network by minimizing
the following lost function.
Li(θi) = E(s,a,r,s′)∼U(D)
[(
r + γmax
a′
Qˆ(s′, a′; θ−i )−Q(s, a; θi)
)2]
, (17)
where γ is the discount factor, θi are the parameters of the Q-networks at episode i and θ−i
are the parameters of the target network, i.e., Qˆ. Differentiating the loss function in (17) with
respect to the parameters of the neural networks, we have the following gradient:
∇θiL(θi) = E(s,a,r,s′)
[(
r + γmax
a′
Qˆ(s′, a′; θ−i )−Q(s, a; θi)∇θiQ(s, a; θi)
)]
. (18)
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Fig. 5: Deep dueling neural network architecture based solution
The loss function is then minimized to update the parameters of the deep dueling network.
After every C steps, the algorithm updates the target network parameters θ−i with the Q-network
parameters θi. The target network parameters remain unchanged between individual updates.
V. OPTIMAL DECEPTION STRATEGY WITH DEEP DUELING NEURAL NETWORK
A. Deep Dueling Neural Network Architecture
According to [29], the convergence rate of the deep Q-learning algorithm is still limited
due to the overestimation of the optimizer, especially in systems with large action and state
spaces as considered in this work. Therefore, we propose a deep dueling algorithm [29], which
was also originally developed by Google DeepMind in 2016, to further improve the system’s
convergence speed. The key idea making the deep dueling superior to conventional approaches
is its novel neural network architecture. Clearly, in many states, it is unnecessary to estimate
the value of corresponding actions as the choice of these actions has no repercussion on what
happens [29]. For example, the rate adaptation actions only matter when the jammer attacks
the channel at low power levels. Hence, instead of estimating the action-value function, i.e.,
Q-function, the algorithm divides the deep neural network into two sequences, i.e., streams, of
fully connected layers to separately estimate the values of states and advantages of actions3. The
3The value function represents how good it is for the system to be in a given state. The advantage function is used to measure
the importance of a certain action compared with others [29].
values and advantages are then combined at the output layer as shown in Fig. 5. In this way, the
deep dueling algorithm can achieve more robust estimates of state value, and thus significantly
improving its convergence rate as well as stability. Note that the flowchart of the deep dueling
algorithm is the same as in the deep Q-learning. The main difference between the deep dueling
algorithm and other conventional deep reinforcement learning algorithms is the deep dueling
neural network. In the following, we present details of how to separate the Q-values into the
value and the advantage functions.
Recall that given a stochastic policy pi, the values of state-action pair (s, a) and state s are as
follows:
Qpi(s, a) = E[rt|st = s, at = a, pi],Vpi(s) = Ea∼pi(s)[Qpi(s, a)]. (19)
The advantage function of actions can be expressed as:
Gpi(s, a) = Qpi(s, a)− Vpi(s). (20)
Specifically, the value function V corresponds to how good it is to be in a particular state s [29].
The state-action pair, i.e., Q-function, calculates the value of performing action a in state s. The
advantage function decouples the state value from the Q-function to measure the importance of
each action.
To estimate values of V and G functions, we use a dueling neural network in which one
stream of fully-connected layers outputs a scalar V(s; β) and the other stream estimates an |A|-
dimensional vector G(s, a;α), where α and β are the parameters of fully-connected layers. These
two sequences are then combined at the output layer to obtain the Q-function by (21).
Q(s, a;α, β) = V(s; β) + G(s, a;α). (21)
Note that (21) applies to all (s, a) instances. Thus, to express (21) in a matrix form, one needs to
replicate the scalar, V(s; β), |A| times. Importantly, Q(s, a;α, β) is a parameterized estimate of
the true Q-function, and given Q, we cannot obtain V and G uniquely. In other words, adding a
constant to V(s; β) and subtracting the same constant from G(s, a;α) result in the same Q-value.
Therefore, (21) is unidentifiable resulting in a poor performance. To address this problem, the
combining module of the network implements the following mapping:
Q(s, a;α, β) = V(s; β) + (G(s, a;α)−max
a∈A
G(s, a;α)). (22)
In this way, the advantage function estimator has zero advantage when choosing action. Intu-
itively, given a∗ = argmaxa∈AQ(s, a;α, β) = argmaxa∈A G(s, a;α), we have Q(s, a∗;α, β) =
V(s; β). Therefore, we can convert (22) into a simple form by replacing the max operator with
an average as follows:
Q(s, a;α, β) = V(s; β) + (G(s, a;α)− 1|A|∑
a
G(s, a;α)). (23)
Note that subtracting the mean in (23) solves the unidentifiable problem. However, it does not
change the relative rank of the advantage function values, and hence the Q-values for actions at
each state. Based on (23) and the advantages of the deep reinforcement learning, we develop the
Algorithm 2 Deep Dueling Neural Network Based Anti-jamming Algorithm
1: Initialize replay memory D to capacity D.
2: Initialize the primary network Q including two fully-connected layers with random weights
α and β.
3: Initialize the target network Qˆ as a copy of the primary Q-network with weights α− = α
and β− = β.
4: for episode=1 to I do
5: Base on the -greedy algorithm, with probability , select a random action at at state st.
Otherwise, select at = argmaxQ∗(st, at;α, β).
6: Perform action at and observe reward rt and next state st+1.
7: Store transition (st, at, rt, st+1) in the replay memory.
8: Sample random mini-batch of transitions (sj, aj, rj, sj+1) from the replay memory.
9: Combine the value function and advantage functions as follows:
Q(sj, aj;α, β) = V(sj; β) +
(G(sj, aj;α)− 1|A|∑
aj
G(sj, aj;α)
)
. (24)
10: yj = rj + γmaxaj+1 Qˆ(sj+1, aj+1;α−, β−).
11: Perform a gradient descent step on (yj −Q(sj, aj;α, β))2.
12: Every C steps reset Qˆ = Q.
13: end for
deep dueling algorithm for the anti-jamming strategy as shown in Algorithm 2. Note that (23) is
viewed and implemented as a part of the network and not as a separated algorithmic step [29].
In addition, V(s; β) and G(s, a;α) are estimated automatically without any extra supervision or
modifications in the algorithm.
B. Complexity Analysis and Implementation
Typically, deep reinforcement learning (and deep learning in general) requires many CPU and
GPU resources, especially for large-scale and complex problems which require more hidden
layers. Several approaches have been developed to reduce the complexity of deep learning. The
authors in [31] proposed the network compression method to convert densely connected neural
networks into sparsely connected networks. It was proved that the storage and computation load
are reduced by a factor of 10. Moreover, the authors demonstrated that by using the network
compression method, deep learning algorithms can be implemented on simple devices such
as IoT platforms from Qualcomm, Intel, and NVidia. Note that, our proposed deep dueling
algorithm only implements one hidden layer for each stream of the deep neural network. Together
with recent advances in network compression, approximate computing, or specialized accelerator
hardware, our proposed solution is feasible for general wireless devices.
For ultra-low power IoT devices which cannot implement deep reinforcement learning algo-
rithms, the complex tasks can be offloaded to a nearby resourceful device, e.g., an IoT gateway
or a nearby edge computing node. Specifically, at each state sj , given the current policy, the
transmitter takes an action aj and observes the result rj and the next state sj+1. This transition,
i.e., (sj; aj; rj; sj+1), is then stored in a memory pool. After a certain period, e.g., one hour, the
experiences in the memory pool will be sent to a resourceful device to train the deep neural
network. Then, the optimal policy, i.e., the Q-table, is sent back to the transmitter to update
the current policy. This optimal policy will be then used at the transmitter to make real-time
decisions.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Parameter Setting
In the system under consideration, we set the energy storage capacity at 10 units. The
fundamental energy unit can be considered to be 60 µJ [32]. The data queue of the transmitter
can store up to 10 packets in which the packet size can be considered to be 300 bits [33]. The
jammer has four transmit power levels, i.e., PJ = {0W, 4W, 10W, 15W}, with Pmax= 15W [34].
If the transmitter performs deception and the jammer attacks the channel, the transmitter can
harvest energy from or backscatter data through the strong jamming signals. As mentioned, the
more power the jammer uses to attack the channel, the more energy and data the transmitter can
harvest and backscatter, respectively. Thus, we set e = {0, 2, 3, 4} and d̂ = {0, 1, 2, 3}. For the
rate adaptation technique, we set drm ={2, 1, 0} corresponding to the jamming power levels PJ
= {4W, 10W, 15W}. Other parameters are provided in Table I. Note that our proposed solutions
do not require the information about the jammer and the environment, e.g., data arrival rate,
miss detection probability, and backscatter rate, in advance. These information can be learned
through the online learning process to obtain the optimal defense policy for the transmitter.
TABLE I: PARAMETER SETTING
Symbol ev d̂a ef d̂de er pe λ K pmiss
Value 1 4 1 3 1 0.5 0.7 3 0.01
For deep Q-learning algorithms, for fair comparisons, we adopt parameters based on the
common settings for designing neural networks [27], [29]. Specifically, for the deep Q-learning
algorithm, two fully-connected hidden layers are implemented together with input and output
layers. For the deep dueling algorithm, the neural network is divided into two streams. Each
stream consists of a hidden layer connected to the input and output layers as illustrated in
Fig. 5. The size of the hidden layers is 64. The mini-batch size is set at 64. The maximum
size of the experience replay buffer is 10, 000, and the target Q-network is updated every 1, 000
iterations [27], [28]. All learning algorithms use the -greedy scheme with the initial value of 
set at 1 and its final value set at 0.1 [26].
To evaluate the proposed solution, we compare its performance with three other schemes:
(i) harvest-then-transmit (HTT), (ii) backscatter mode (BM), (iii) rate adaptation (RA), and (iv)
without deception (WD).
• HTT: For this policy, the transmitter only implements the harvest-then-transmit (HTT)
protocol [18] and uses the harvested energy to actively transmit data, perform the deception,
or perform the rate adaptation technique. This scheme is to evaluate the impact of energy
harvesting on the system performance.
• BM: In this scheme, the transmitter can use the ambient backscatter technique to transmit
data or perform the rate adaptation technique when the jammer attacks the channel (after
performing deception). This policy evaluates the impact of ambient backscatter communi-
cations on the system performance.
• RA: With this policy, when the jammer attacks the channel, the transmitter can only perform
the rate adaptation technique to transmit data. This scheme is adopted to evaluate the
system performance under jamming attacks when the transmitter does not leverage the
strong jamming signals.
• WD: With this policy, the transmitter will transmit data as long as it has data and sufficient
energy. This scheme is used to show the performance of the system without using our
proposed deception strategy.
For fair comparisons, the optimal policies of the HTT, BM, and RA schemes are also obtained
by the deep dueling algorithm presented in Section V. The performance metrics used for evalu-
ation are the average throughput, packet loss, and packet delivery ratio (PDR). Specifically, the
average throughout is defined by the number of packets that the transmitter can successfully
transmit to the receiver in a time unit. The packet loss corresponds to the average number of
dropped packets in each time unit due to the miss detection, jamming attacks, and limit storage
of the data queue. Finally, the PDR is defined by the ratio between the total number of packets
arrived at the system and the total number of packets successfully transmitted to the receiver.
B. Simulation Results
1) Convergence of Deep Reinforcement Learning Algorithms: In Fig. 6, we show the con-
vergences of the Q-learning, deep Q-learning, and deep dueling algorithms. It can be observed
that, due to the slow-convergence problem, the average throughput obtained by the Q-learning
algorithm is much lower than those of the deep Q-learning and deep dueling algorithms. By
using the novel deep dueling neural network architecture, the deep dueling can converge to the
optimal policy within 4× 104 iterations. For the deep Q-learning algorithm, it cannot obtain the
optimal policy after 105 iterations due to the overestimation of the optimizer. This is due to the
overestimation of the optimizer. In contrast, by using the two separated streams to estimate the
advantage and value functions, our proposed deep dueling can achieve a faster convergence rate
and stable performance. Note that the reactive jammer can adjust its attack policy by sensing the
activities on the target channel. Thus, with the proposed deep dueling algorithm, the transmitter
can quickly and efficiently adapt the optimal defense strategy when the jammer adjusts its policy.
In the next section we use the results obtained by the deep dueling algorithm after 4 × 104
iterations and by the Q-learning algorithm after 106 iterations. Here, the Q-learning algorithm
is used as a benchmark to compare the performance with the proposed deep dueling algorithm.
2) System Performance: First, we perform simulations to evaluate and compare the utility
of the transmitter (under the proposed solution, i.e., Algorithm 2) with that of the jammer.
Specifically, the utility of the transmitter is defined by the average number of packets successfully
transmitted to the receiver in a time unit, i.e., the average throughput. The utility of the jammer is
defined as in Section II-C. It can be observed that, when the average attack power of the jammer
increases from 1W to 4W, the average throughput of the proposed solution slightly decreases
as the transmitter has less chance to actively transmit data. In addition, harvesting energy from
and backscattering data through the jamming signals are not really beneficial when the average
attack power of the jammer is low, i.e., less than 4W. When the power budget of the jammer
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is larger, i.e., Pavg ≥ 4W, the average throughput obtained by our proposed solution increases
as the transmitter has more opportunities to leverage the strong jamming signals to support its
transmissions. Thus, the utility of the jammer quickly decreases. This reveals an interesting result
that our proposed solution is very effective to deal with reactive jamming attacks even if the
jammer has a very high power budget.
Next, we perform simulations to evaluate and compare the performance of our proposed
solution with those of the HTT, BM, RA, and WD policies in terms of average throughput,
packet loss, and packet delivery ratio in several scenarios. In particular, in Fig. 8, we vary the
average attack power Pavg of the jammer and observe the performance of the system under
different strategies. The performance of the proposed solution can be explained as above. It can
be observed that for the BM, HTT and RA strategies, the transmitter only can backscatter data,
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Fig. 8: (a) Average throughput (packets/time unit), (b) Packet loss (packets/time unit), and (c)
PDR vs. Pavg.
harvest energy, or reduce the data rate, respectively, under the jamming attack, and thus their
performances are much lower than that of the proposed solution which can optimize and trade-off
all activities. Note that for the HTT policy, the average throughput increases when Pavg increases
from 4W to 7W and decreases when the average attack power of the jammer is high. This is due
to the fact that when the jammer often attacks the channel, the transmitter has fewer opportunities
to actively transmit data to the receiver. For the WD policy, the average throughput decreases
when the attack probability increases. The reason is that under this policy, the transmitter can
only uses the harvested energy from the surrounding environment to actively transmit data when
the jammer does not attack the channel. In Fig. 8(b), we show the average number of packet
loss of the system. Obviously, the packet loss obtained by our proposed solution is always much
lower than those of the other solutions. As a result, the PDR obtained by our proposed solution
is higher than those of other solutions as shown in Fig. 8(c).
Next, in Fig. 9, we vary the packet arrival probability and evaluate the system performance in
terms of average throughput, packet loss, and PDR under different policies. As shown in Fig. 9(a),
when λ increases from 0.1 to 0.6, the average throughput obtained by the proposed deep dueling
algorithm increases as the transmitter can transmit more packets. Nevertheless, when λ > 0.6, the
average throughput remains stable because the system reaches to the saturation state. Note that
the proposed algorithm can always achieve the highest throughput. As such, the PDR obtained
by the proposed solution is also higher than those of other schemes as shown in Fig. 9(b). Note
that the PDR decreases with λ as the total number of packets arrived in the system increases.
Moreover, as shown in Fig. 9(b), the packet loss of the system increases proportionally to the
packet arrival rate as the transmitter cannot transmit all the arrival packets and the data queue
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Fig. 9: (a) Average throughput (packets/time unit), (b) Packet loss (packets/time unit), and (c)
PDR vs. packet arrival probability.
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Fig. 10: (a) Average throughput (packets/time unit), (b) Packet loss (packets/time unit), and (c)
PDR vs. energy arrival probability.
size is limited. Note that the performance of the Q-learning algorithm is not as good as that of
the deep dueling algorithm as it cannot converge to the optimal policy within 106 iterations.
Finally, we vary the probability that the transmitter can successfully harvest one unit of energy
from the environment as shown in Fig. 10. As shown in Fig. 10(a), when pe increases, the average
throughput of the system obtained by all the solutions increases as the transmitter can harvest
more energy from the surrounding environment to support its operations, i.e., deception or active
transmissions. This leads to the reduction of the packet loss as shown in Fig. 10(b) and the in-
crease of the PDR in Fig. 10(c). In overall, by optimizing the time for data backscattering, energy
harvesting, and rate adaptation, our proposed solution always achieves the highest throughput
and lowest packet loss compared to those of the other solutions. Again, the Q-learning algorithm
cannot achieve the optimal defense policy for the system due to the slow-convergence problem.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have developed the intelligent anti-jamming framework which allows the
transmitter to effectively defeat powerful reactive jamming attacks. Specifically, with the decep-
tion mechanism, the transmitter can perform the deception strategy to attract the jammer and
drain its power. Furthermore, we introduce the novel ideas of using recent advanced technologies,
i.e., ambient backscatter communications and RF energy harvesting, to enable the transmitter to
leverage the strong jamming signals while being attacked to further improve system performance.
To deal with the dynamic and uncertainty of the jammer and the environment, we have developed
the new MDP to formulate the dynamic optimization problem and proposed the deep dueling
algorithm to quickly obtain the optimal defense policy for the system. Extensive simulations
have demonstrated that the proposed solution can successfully defeat reactive jamming attacks
even with very high attack power levels. Interestingly, we have shown that by leveraging the
jamming signals, the more frequently the jammer attacks the channel, the greater performance
the system can achieve. Moreover, our proposed solution can improve the average throughput
by up to 20 times higher compared to the solution without using the deception strategy.
APPENDIX A
THE PROOF OF THEOREM 1
To prove this theorem, we first show that the Markov chain is irreducible. It means that the
process can go from one state to any other state after a finite number of steps. In particular, in the
system under consideration, the reactive jammer only attacks the channel when the transmitter
actively transmits data. Thus, at the beginning of a time slot, the state of the jammer is always
idle, i.e., j = 0. Similarly, the state of the deception always equals 0 at the beginning of a
time slot. As a result, at the beginning of a time slot, the system state is s = (0, 0, d, e). If the
transmitter chooses to perform the deception and the jammer attacks the channel, the system
moves to state s′ = (1, 1, d, e− ef). If the jammer does not attack the channel, the system moves
to state s′ = (1, 0, d, e−ef). Thus, from given states of the jammer and the deception, the system
can move to any other states of the jammer and the deception after a finite number of steps.
Similarly, from given data and energy states, the system can move to any other states of the
data and energy queues after a finite number of steps. In particular, if the transmitter chooses to
actively transmit da packets to the receiver, the the data state moves from d to d− da, and the
energy state moves from e to e− (da× er). If the transmitter chooses to perform the deception,
the energy state will move from e to e − ef . After performing the deception, if the jammer
attacks the channel and the transmitter chooses to harvest energy, the energy state moves from
e to e+ eJn. If the transmitter chooses to backscatter data, the data state moves from d to d−dJn.
If the transmitter chooses to adapt its rate, the data state moves from d to d−drm and the energy
state moves from e to e− (drm × er). In contrast, if the jammer does not attack the channel and
the transmitter chooses to actively transmit data, the data state moves from d to d− dde and the
energy state moves from e to e− (dde × er). If there are K packets arriving at the system, the
data state will move from d to d +K. If the transmitter can successfully harvest energy from
the ambient RF signals, the energy state moves from e to e+ 1.
Thus, the state space S (which is a combination of the states of the jammer, the deception,
the data queue, and the energy queue) contains only one communicating class, i.e., from a given
state the process can move to any other states after a finite number of steps. In other words, the
MDP with states in S is irreducible. As such, the average throughput R(pi) is well defined and
does not depend on the initial state for every pi [25]. Thus, we can always obtain the optimal
policy for the transmitter regardless of the initial system state.
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